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Abstract 
Understanding the long-run dynamics of OPEC and non-OPEC crude oil prices is important in 
an era of increased financialization of petroleum markets. Utilizing an ECM within a threshold 
cointegration and CGARCH errors framework, we provide evidence on the cointegrating 
relationship and estimate how and to what extent the respective prices adjust to eliminate 
disequilibrium. Our findings suggest that the adjustment process of OPEC prices to the positive 
discrepancies is slow which implies that OPEC producers do not prefer moderate oil prices; 
however, the reverse holds for non-OPEC producers. These results reflect distinct competitive 
behaviors between OPEC and non-OPEC producers. 
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I. Introduction and literature review  
The increasing growth in demand for crude oil from economies such as China, India and the 
Middle-East has had an impact on the prices of oil, which reached a record level of $145 per 
barrel in 2008. Changes in the price of oil are increasingly significant and have influenced every 
economy around the world. The analysis of oil prices has always been of considerable interest to 
all people. Established in September 1960, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) exercises enormous influence on the world prices of oil due to many factors, particularly 
its spare oil capacity of roughly 4 million barrels per day in 2014, based on an assumed 85% 
utilization rate.
1
 Additionally, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), non-OPEC 
countries had an excess demand of 35.5 million barrels per day in 2013;
2
 this gap is satisfied 
with the oil supplied by the 12 members of OPEC.
3
 In 2013, the non-OPEC share of global oil 
production was approximately 59.8% of the total world production of oil. Due to the non-OPEC 
excess demand-supply, it is a common belief that non-OPEC producers behave as price takers 
and that OPEC may play a central role in the world oil market by adjusting its production and 
setting the prices of oil. However, it remains the case that the dynamics in crude oil markets 
depend on their different market fundamental situations (Mensi et al. 2014; Zhang and Zhang 
2015). These dynamics are attributed to their price regimes such as Brent, West Texas 
Intermediate and OPEC Reference Basket. The oil market itself appears to be in charge of 
pricing.   
There is a vast literature on the price of oil. Gately (1993) establishes that the reductions in 
the world demand for oil following the increase in oil prices in the 1970s have not been 
completely reversed by the price cuts of the 1980s. De Santis (2003) explains the volatility of 
crude oil prices by focusing on the quota regime as a primary characteristic adopted by OPEC 
agreements. Recently, Nakov and Nuño (2013) incorporated the ample spare capacity and the 
volatile domestic production, as features of Saudi Arabia, into a general equilibrium model 
where the global oil market is modeled as a dominant producer with a competitive fringe. They 
                                                          
1
 Source: 2014 World Oil Outlook. OPEC, Austria. www.opec.org  
2
 Source: Oil Market Report, Annual Statistical Supplement, IEA. www.oilmarketreport.org  
3
 Filling such a gap requires OPEC members to coordinate their oil production policies through incremental 
capacities; these reactions help avoid sudden increases in crude oil prices. In addition, if supply outruns demand, 
over time OPEC will manage the excess capacity to avoid sudden decreases in oil prices. According to Smith 
(2009), the oil demand and supply curves are highly inelastic in the short-run; shifts in the curves can lead to 
excessive price volatility.
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find that Saudi Arabia produces a smaller amount of oil than its capacity given the oil price, 
allowing it to charge a markup over its marginal cost. Lin (2009) finds oligopolistic behavior 
among non-OPEC producers and collusion among OPEC producers during the period 1970-
2004. Hamilton (2008) investigates the factors responsible for changes in crude oil prices by 
reviewing the statistical behavior of oil prices and the key features of crude oil supply and 
demand. He concludes that there is an increasing contribution of scarcity rent to the petroleum 
price. Li (2010) shows that the non-OPEC production Granger-causes world oil prices and that 
the causation runs from the refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil to OPEC production. 
He concludes that it is not appropriate to treat OPEC as a dominant firm. Additionally, Ji and 
Guo (2015), using an event study methodology and an AR-GARCH model, show that the 
reactions of oil price returns to different OPEC production announcements are inconsistent.    
Few of the previous works assume that the adjustment process is asymmetric. Moreover, a 
number of studies claim that there is an asymmetric relationship between the oil price followed 
by OPEC and non-OPEC countries (Chen et al. 2005; Ewing et al. 2006; Bekiros et al. 2008; 
Hammoudeh et al. 2010; Perdiguero-Garćia 2013). Chen et al. (2005) document new supportive 
evidence for asymmetric adjustment in United States retail gasoline prices. The asymmetric 
transmission is found to occur through the spot markets of crude oil and refinery gas and their 
future markets. A number of empirical studies have also been performed on price asymmetry for 
the North American markets, but the findings of these studies are mixed (Borenstein et al. 1997; 
Borenstein and Kellogg 2014
4
; Godby et al. 2000). According to Borenstein (2008), oil price 
increases do not reflect a compensation mechanism for the weakness in the US dollar featured in 
a long-run declining trend of its purchase power. He indicates that, during 2007, the dollar lost 
approximately 10% against others major currencies whereas the price of crude oil in dollar 
increased roughly 50%, with oil prices being set based more on the balance of worldwide supply 
and demand. The existing empirical evidence in favor of (or against) price asymmetries in oil 
markets is skillfully summarized by Perdiguero-Garćia (2013), who conducts a meta-analysis of 
the related contributions and concludes that the smaller (higher) level of competition in the 
                                                          
4
 They study the implications of spatial crude oil price divergence for the price of refined products in the US. By 
using monthly spot crude oil prices, they conclude that the transport constraint has caused a large price differential 
in crude oil. They show that the decrease in the US Midwest crude oil price has not been passed through to the 
refined product prices, namely, gasoline and diesel.       
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market displays higher (smaller) degree of price asymmetries. He states that asymmetries are 
more difficult to detect in analyses that cover a long period of time.  
The variability in the crude oil price can be explained by OPEC and non-OPEC crude oil 
price volatilities and by their oil production variability. Nevertheless, even if financial trader 
activities are confined to the oil futures market, their speculative trading in spot markets can 
provoke oil price volatility (Smith 2009; Zhang 2013; Zhang and Wang 2013). According to 
Smith (2009), the oil market share of financial traders increased between 2004 and 2008; 
meanwhile, the share of oil producers decreased during that span. Many authors (e.g., Smith 
2009; Zhang and Wei 2011; Wu and Zhang 2014) consider that non-fundamental factors such as 
speculative activities in the crude oil future markets, financial market risks and geopolitical 
conflicts may drive the short and long-run volatility of international crude oil prices. Based on 
fundamental factors, Wu and Zhang (2014) question the effects from October 2005 to November 
2013 of China’s real crude oil net imports5 and real monthly Brent oil spot price changes. They 
find that, in the short- and long-run, China’s crude oil net imports do not significantly affect 
Brent price changes. However, using variance decomposition, they show that China’s crude oil 
net imports contribute to Brent price volatility approximately 10%, that is, less than the US 
dollar exchange rate. Zhang and Wei (2011) empirically analyze the asymmetric and dynamic 
impacts of various risk factors from January 1997 to July 2007 based on the weekly average 
returns in the US, UK, and Japan stock markets on the weekly US WTI futures oil price changes. 
They use the time-varying Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
(APT) to develop a dynamic factor model.
6
 They find that the three stock market risks have 
significant time-varying effects and can exert asymmetric linear and non-linear shocks to the 
crude oil market in their up and down conditions and that the dynamic risk of the US stock 
market on the oil market has the largest volatility compared to the British and Japanese markets. 
By considering US fundamental oil macro-variables and the US industrial production index, 
Zhang et al. (2015) find that rational bubbles
7
 exist in the short-run dynamic of WTI crude oil 
prices, mainly around 2008. They explain that their findings are closely related to the new 
                                                          
5
 According to the US EIA (Short-Term Energy Outlook, May 2015), China is the top annual world oil net importer. 
6
 The influence of stock market risk is based on the excess oil price return defined as weekly US WTI oil price 
returns minus the risk-free returns approximated by weekly returns of 3-month US T-bills. Also, the excess stock 
market return is calculated by subtracting the weekly return of 3-month US T-bills from the stock market return. 
7
 According to Lammerding et al. (2013), Zhang et al. (2015) define a bubble as an asymmetric, non-linear and non-
stationary deviation of crude oil prices from the fundamental values.
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changes in international crude oil markets since the end of 2004, which consist of a vast number 
of investment hedge funds with implications for the financial feature of crude oil assets. 
The changes in crude oil prices over time may be analyzed through the dynamic volatilities 
in the short and long-run. The hypothesis that we will evaluate is that the increase in OPEC crude 
oil price volatility can be attenuated by the decrease in non-OPEC oil price volatility and vice-
versa. We expect that the OPEC dynamic volatilities of oil prices cannot be the main source of 
price variability in comparison to the non-OPEC prices. We explore the magnitude of the extent 
to which the OPEC and non-OPEC price series mutually interact to reveal the competitive nature 
in the oil market by using nonlinear cointegration and determining their reactions to positive or 
negative discrepancies (i.e. oil prices that are too high or too low) in the short and long-run. 
Considering the dynamic volatilities in short and long-run, we suppose that the permanent 
component of volatility is more persistent than the transitory volatility, even if the latter has 
higher volatilities. However, it remains the case that these transitory volatilities impact the long-
run oil price process. According to Mensi et al. (2014), the presence of structural breaks reduces 
the persistence of volatility and improves the understanding of such volatility in oil markets. 
Our contribution to the recent related literature consists of exploring, through a new 
modeling approach, the ECM-TAR(MTAR)-CGARCH analytical framework.
8
 This approach 
investigates whether the prices of oil for both groups are cointegrated, with the price adjustment 
process being either symmetric or asymmetric, and determines whether any interaction exists 
between the two different oil prices. Empirically, we explore the asymmetric cointegration first 
by using the threshold autoregressive (TAR) and momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) 
methods of adjustment suggested by Enders and Siklos (2001). They argue that the standard 
cointegration test and its extensions are misspecified if the adjustment is asymmetric.  
The findings are that OPEC prices adjust more slowly than non-OPEC prices when they 
differ from their thresholds and that there is evidence of asymmetry in both the non-OPEC and 
OPEC price series. The negative MTAR-deviations of crude oil prices from the long-run 
equilibrium are corrected at moderate rates at a similar magnitude for both OPEC and non-OPEC 
countries. OPEC cannot drive crude oil prices down (up) at a similar speed for all producers; 
thus the speed adjustments show evidence of competitive behaviors between OPEC and non-
                                                          
8
 This new framework combines the ECM with the asymmetric cointegration and CGARCH errors structure (more 
details are in Appendix A12). It leads to a parsimonious representation of some stylized features of the OPEC and 
non-OPEC prices, such as the time-varying volatility and volatility clustering. 
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OPEC countries. However, because the conditional volatility has a long memory (Mensi et al. 
2014) and shocks on the long-run component decay slowly, all producers in crude oil markets 
will face not only persistent shocks but also high short-run volatilities in the transitory variance 
(Poon et al. 2006). This outcome is corroborated by the results of Ji and Guo (2015), who 
indicate that crude oil price returns, induced by oil-related events, exhibit a stronger persistent 
effect. The implication of these results is that there is not a unique market scheme but instead 
diverse pricing behavior related to economic and geo-political factors between OPEC and non-
OPEC countries. Indeed, when the price increases, non-OPEC countries correct any market 
imbalances that may occur due to the slowness of the response of OPEC countries through a 
unified strategic reaction. However, when the price decreases, OPEC countries adjust any market 
imbalances that may occur due to the tardiness of non-OPEC producer reactions through 
multiple strategic responses. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reports the description 
of the data and the cointegration tests, Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical findings of 
the error correction model, and Section 4 concludes.  
 
II. Data and Cointegration tests 
II.1 Data and Preliminary tests  
The data are based on the per barrel price of crude oil in US Dollars at the monthly frequency for 
both OPEC and non-OPEC countries. The advantage of the monthly frequency is that there are 
no missing observations and, according to Baumeister et al. (2014), there is no gain from 
switching to mixed data sampling (MIDAS) models and the monthly model is preferred to an 
infra-month-frequency. In a future paper, we expect to investigate the available weekly or daily 
frequency data of crude oil prices to detect whether dynamic volatility will be more amplified. 
The averages of the OPEC and non-OPEC prices are based on the affiliations of the countries for 
the stated period, which may differ from current affiliations. The most commonly used primary 
benchmarks of crude oil prices are the West Texas Intermediate (WTI), Brent Blend, and Dubai 
Crude. As such, the OPEC Reference Basket
9
 is among the other well-known blends, including 
the Tapis Crude, Bonny Light and the Urals. Following the construction of the U.S. Energy 
                                                          
9
 The OPEC Basket price is composed of 12 OPEC crude grades: Saharan Blend (Algeria), Girassol (Angola), 
Oriente (Ecuador), Iran Heavy (Iran), Basra Light (Iraq), Kuwait Export (Kuwait), Es Sider (Libya), Bonny Light 
(Nigeria), Qatar Marine (Qatar), Arab Light (Saudi Arabia), Murban (UAE) and Merey (Venezuela).  
Source: http://www.energycharter.org/what-we-do/trade-and-transit/trade-and-transit-thematic-reports/putting-a-
price-on-energy-oil-pricing-update-2011/ 
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Information Administration (EIA), monthly oil prices variables are constructed as averages of 
daily data over the month. The monthly data are based on FOB prices from the first business day 
of the first week. OPEC and non-OPEC prices are calculated as the average price (FOB) 
weighted by the export volume. To include the structural changes that occurred in the history of 
the international oil market, our sample monthly data cover the period January 1973 to April 
2013 (Fig. A1).
10
 This figure striking shows how all these prices move closely together. The two 
variables are converted into natural logs and labeled LOPEC and LNOPEC. The mean-to- 
median ratio of each variable suggests that the distribution of the variable is not far from a 
symmetrical distribution, given that this ratio is close to one (Table 1). Using the Van Der 
Waerden normal scores test, as nonparametric test statistics in the one-sample test framework, to 
test the null hypothesis of the equality of median to mean, we accept the alternative hypothesis. 
In addition, the D’Agostino-Pearson (DP) omnibus test for both skewness and kurtosis conducts 
to reject the null hypothesis of the normality assumption: for OPEC and non-OPEC prices, we 
obtain                      and                     , respectively. 
Consequently, the distribution of the logged OPEC and non-OPEC prices cannot be normally 
distributed. In addition, to check whether the underlying data are normally distributed, we use 
the Quantiles-plot. The results indicate that the QQ-plots do not lie in a straight line because the 
two distributions for each series deviate from the linearity pattern and visually there are fat tails.  
   Table 1 Descriptive statistics and unit root tests of LOPEC    and LNOPEC    
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera
 a
 ADF
 b
 
LOPEC 3.186 3.046 0.677 0.729 2.727 43.30 -2.682 
LNOPEC 3.174 3.086 0.660 0.626 2.739 32.20 -3.004 
    Notes: 
a
 The P-value is 0.00. 
b
 The critical value at 1% is -3.98. Number of obs. is 472. T=1973-2013. 
 
According to Horn (2004), we expect that the crude oil prices do not follow an independent 
and identical distribution. If the random variables are independent, then the unconditional 
distribution is equal to the conditional distribution. However, temporal dependence doesn’t allow 
the independence feature even in the normal distribution; it becomes more interesting for the 
conditional distribution. Thus, the empirical analysis is focused on the unconditional distribution 
of crude oil prices, based on past information and requiring stable processes. From Table 1, the 
                                                          
10
 The data are gathered from the US Energy Information Administration; the links used to collect these data are the 
following: http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=I060000004&f=M (for OPEC). 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=I070000004&f=M (for non-OPEC).  
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standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis fail to confirm the normality of each variable. The 
distribution of the crude oil prices at monthly data exhibits a positive skewness and an excess 
kurtosis, indicating price volatility; thus, we have a platykurtic distribution. Also, the statistics of 
the parametric Jarque-Bera test strongly reject the null hypothesis of normal distribution.   
To obtain the integration order, the oil prices were initially tested by the ADF and ADF-GLS 
with constant and trend using traditional and modified AIC and SIC (Ng and Perron 2001) to 
improve the size and the power of the test. These statistics suggest that OPEC and non-OPEC 
prices have a unit root process but are stationary in their first difference. As a reversed test 
because it also rejects the null hypothesis of level stationarity of the crude oil prices, the outcome 
of KPSS Lagrange Multiplier test confirms the ADF test decision. When the variables are I(1), 
the unconditional distribution may not exist; the underlying stochastic process cannot lead to the 
platykurtic unconditional distribution if the process is not strictly stationary.  
The plots of the first difference of the logged crude oil prices indicate conditional 
heteroscedasticity, but that does not necessarily mean that the series are from a platykurtic 
conditional distribution. Thus, the unconditional platykurtosis could reflect conditional 
heteroscedasticity. A GARCH model may be sufficient to address this purpose by capturing the 
peakedness and the fat-tailedness of the unconditional distribution (Diebold and Lopez 1995). 
The motion of non-OPEC prices does not occur in isolation; instead the prices cluster 
dynamically with OPEC prices (Fig. A1). The existence of volatility clustering would justify the 
CGARCH framework (Engle and Patton 2000).
11
 The conditionally platykurtic and conditionally 
heteroscedastic properties may be mixed in a single model as a regime-switching model or 
multivariate distribution using mixed-normal conditional distributions (Holton 2014; Alexander 
and Lazar 2006). These approaches will be explored in our next study.  
 
II.2 Cointegration tests  
To detect the long-run equilibrium relationship between OPEC and non-OPEC prices, we begin 
with Engle and Granger’s (EG, 1987) and Perron and Rodriguez’s (PR, 2001) cointegration test 
methods, assuming a symmetric adjustment. These tests have been implemented using GAUSS 
                                                          
11
 Volatility shocks lead to an uncertain future evolution, indicating the presence of volatility clustering (Engle and 
Patton 2000), which means that when negative news occurs during price increases, volatility also increases. This 
phenomenon appears when the differences in the interpretability of information from the crude oil market amplify 
competition between OPEC and non-OPEC producers. 
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software. Each cointegration test includes a constant and trend as deterministic components 
because the visual data support a constant and trend. To run EG test, the lag order is chosen by 
using AIC and T-significance. The results in Table 2 show that EG test rejects the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration at 5% in accordance with AIC and T-significance criteria, 
evidencing that cointegration relationships exist between the oil selling price influenced and 
followed by OPEC and non-OPEC countries. By using a time-varying average distance 
measurement and an ECM combined with a directed acyclic graph technique, Ji and Fan (2015) 
show that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between the major crude oil prices (such as 
WTI, Brent Blend, Dubai Crude, Tapis Crude and Bonny Light). Additionally, PR test supports 
the results of EG test because it rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 1% for both 
AIC and T-significance criteria. In EG test, if the variables are interchangeable and the sample 
size is sufficient, then the same test decision is attained (Table 2). 
Table 2 Cointegration tests (Dependent variables LOPEC and LNOPEC) 
 EG, LOPEC EG, LNOPEC PR, LOPEC = EG
GLS
 PR, LNOPEC = EG
GLS
 
 AIC T-Sig. AIC T-Sig. MAIC T-Sig. MAIC T-Sig. 
  -0.138 -0.144 -0.152 -0.158 -0.131 -0.151 -0.129 -0.148 
   (-3.432) (-3.661) (-3.659) (-3.887) (-3.359) (-3.964) (-3.293) (-3.875) 
Notes: For EG test: the one sided (lower tail) test of the null hypothesis is that the variables are not 
cointegrated; at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, the critical values are -4.02, -3.40 and -3.09, 
respectively (Rapach and Weber 2004). For PR test: the one sided (lower-tail) test of the null hypothesis 
is that the variables are not cointegrated; at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, the critical values 
are equal to -3.33, -2.76 and -2.47, respectively (Perron and Rodriguez 2001). 
 
According to Horvath and Watson (1995), when there is only one cointegrating vector, 
simple univariate tests provide an alternative to likelihood-based tests. The power trade-off 
between the multivariate and the univariate tests for cointegration is interesting in higher-
dimensional systems. However, in our case, Johansen test explains that the OPEC and non-
OPEC logged price series move together toward one stable long-run relationship. When the 
cointegrating vector is unique, EG test is validated. But, when the cointegrating vector is not 
unique, we may implement a VEC model. We find a significant trace-statistic of 25.35 and a 
significant Max-Eigen statistic of 24.14, with critical values of 19.94 and 18.52 at the 1% level, 
respectively. By using Granger causality/block exogeneity test, from the VEC model instead of 
the VAR model, using the   -statistic, we find bi-directional causality from OPEC prices to non-
OPEC prices, where          with a p-value equal to 9.06E-05 and            with a p-
9 
 
value equal to 0.00. Additionally, in the multivariate setting, the    statistic of Stock and Watson 
(1988) tests the null hypothesis of the stochastic trends of series against their common trends, 
i.e., cointegrated series.
12
 The test is based on filtering the data and using VAR representation. 
Testing for two versus one common trend using the         statistic, the reported test using 
Camacho Gauss program leads to           , which is more negative than the critical value 
of       at the 1% level (Table 3 of Stock and Watson 1988). Thus, we reject the null 
hypothesis in favor of a model in which the two crude oil prices contain a single common trend.  
Johansen test uses sequential tests for determining the number of cointegrating vectors; its 
advantage over Engle-Granger (EG) cointegration test is that it can estimate more than one 
cointegration relationship, mainly if the data set contains more than two time series. But, the 
interpretation of the results becomes difficult when there are multiple cointegrating vectors. It is 
also invariant to the selection of the variable for normalization, whereas the results of EG 
procedure depend on how the single long-run equation is specified. In some cases, based on 
economic theory, it is possible to identify which variable is dependent on the left side of the 
equation. However, Johansen test often leads to a cointegrating vector without economic 
meaning (Hatanaka 1996). The limitation of the Johansen procedure is that it assumes that the 
cointegrating vector remains constant during the sample period, which is not true due to 
technological progress, changes in people’s preferences, economic crisis, policy or regime 
alteration and institutional development (Hamilton 2008). Such limitations are also valid for EG 
method. Threshold cointegration is more appropriate for crude oil prices processes.  
Therefore, the residuals of the model              , where    and    are the OPEC 
and non-OPEC logged crude oil price, respectively, are estimated by following TAR and MTAR 
models, where the lag order is chosen by using AIC and T-significance. Considering the TAR 
model with AIC, the point estimates are calculated to be           and          , having 
the expected signs for convergence (Table 3). The statistic          is greater than the 1% 
critical value. This result implies that the null hypothesis of         can therefore be 
soundly rejected, indicating that the series are cointegrated. After confirming cointegration 
between OPEC and non-OPEC oil prices, the null hypothesis of no asymmetry (     ) can be 
                                                          
12
 They indicate that, if each   series is I(1) but can be jointly characterized by     stochastic trends, then the 
vector representation of these series has   unit roots and       distinct stationary linear combinations, i.e., 
cointegrating vectors.  
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tested by using the standard  -distribution (Enders and Granger 1998). The sample value of 
        with a p-value of 0.015 implies that we can also reject the null hypothesis and find 
evidence of asymmetric adjustment. The TAR model, following the T-significance test for lag 
selection, also supports these findings. Therefore, we can conclude that according to the TAR 
and MTAR tests, the oil prices followed by OPEC and non-OPEC countries are asymmetrically 
cointegrated. OPEC and non-OPEC crude oil market prices have a high asymmetric-
cointegration through the TAR test than the MTAR test, which may be related to the natural flow 
of oil market prices information. The asymmetry feature may be used to stabilize crude oil prices 
at an acceptable level of increase or decrease in the main place of the crude oil market.    
Table 3a Threshold cointegration tests (Dependent variable LOPEC,   )  
Notes: The ** indicates significance at 1% level. The values corresponding to ϕ are compared to the ϕ-
tables computed by Enders and Siklos (2001). The t-values are in parentheses in the 3rd and 4th columns. 
The Threshold Auto-Regressive (TAR) model is                                , where    is the 
indicator function,                                 . For the Momentum TAR, we use       instead 
of       to obtain the threshold  . The threshold is estimated using Chan’s methodology (Chan 1993). 
More technical details on threshold cointegration are available in Appendix A11.   
 
Turning to the MTAR and using AIC (Table 3), the point estimates are found to be    
       and          , which have the expected signs and suggest their convergence. The 
statistic   of 29.556 clearly rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the significance 
level of 1 %. Given that the   value equals 6.296 with a p-value of 0.012, we can reject the null 
hypothesis of symmetric adjustment. The evidence of asymmetric adjustment in terms of   is 
further improved with the MTAR model.   
 Table 3b Threshold cointegration tests (Dependent variable LNOPEC,   ) 
The asymmetric adjustment is found in both the TAR and MTAR models using the AIC and 
T-significance criteria. The points estimate of    and    are found to be negative, suggesting 
          F (P-value)     
TAR 
AIC -0.174 (-4.923) -0.322 (-6.177) 29.338
**
 5.904 (0.015) -0.0514 
T-Sig. -0.088 (-1.783) -0.192 (-3.725) 7.312** 2.795 (0.095) -0.0514 
MTAR 
AIC -0.164 ( -4.426) -0.314 (-6.491) 29.556** 6.296 (0.012) -0.0318 
T-Sig. -0.102 (-2.326) -0.240 (-3.696) 7.928** 3.995 (0.046) -0.0318 
          F (P-value)     
TAR 
AIC -0.305 (-5.847) -0.189 (-5.290) 29.220** 3.572 (0.059) +0.0471 
T-Sig. -0.152 (-3.461) -0.265 (-4.468) 13.482** 2.880 (0.090) -0.0448 
MTAR 
AIC -0.326 (-6.700) -0.167 (-4.468) 31.141** 7.013 (0.008) +0.0276 
T-Sig. -0.320 (-4.983) -0.167 (-4.082) 17.828** 4.739 (0.029) +0.0329 
11 
 
convergence in both the TAR and MTAR models. As documented by Sichel (1993), the 
threshold cointegration of LOPEC prices shows in all cases that          , which means that 
increases tend to persist whereas decreases tend to revert quickly toward equilibrium. By 
contrast, the threshold cointegration of LNOPEC prices notes three cases where          , 
indicating that increases tend to revert toward equilibrium, whereas decreases tend to persist and 
slowly return to the attractor. Hence, the results show that both the TAR and MTAR models 
provide evidence that there are asymmetric adjustments in oil prices between OPEC and non-
OPEC countries. This asymmetric adjustment implies some asymmetries between the changes in 
OPEC oil prices versus non-OPEC oil price shocks and vice versa. Also, from Table 3a, we 
observe that the OPEC adjustment process is not persistent toward equilibrium above the 
threshold for both the TAR and MTAR models. However, the deviations from equilibrium are 
almost quickly eliminated when they are below the threshold parameter. Thus, the long-run 
equilibrium relationship between the OPEC and non-OPEC oil price, below the threshold 
parameter, is more stable with an asymmetric adjustment process.   
 
III. Error correction model   
From the results of the threshold cointegration between the two oil prices, it is possible to 
estimate the asymmetric error correction model. The findings for the ECM are reported in Table 
4a, and both the TAR and MTAR models detect asymmetry in the oil price adjustment of OPEC 
and non-OPEC countries. The MTAR model, which has a consistent threshold estimate, yields 
the lowest AIC in comparison to the other models, and the MTAR specification exhibits greater 
power over the TAR specification (Enders and Granger 1998).  
The comparison between the transitory volatility persistence rate      , defined in Table 
4b, and the permanent decay rate  , through the results of the ECM-Threshold-CGARCH model, 
shows that short-run volatilities are less persistent than long-run volatilities. The 
heteroscedasticity test indicates that the ARCH effect is largely reduced by using ECM-TAR-
CGARCH (the last rows of Table 4b); this improvement in the regressions is explained by the 
diminution of the skewness and kurtosis coefficients. Nevertheless, these volatilities converge to 
the mean reversion    at speed   after an occurrence of shocks because        . Thus,   , -
the long-run component of   
 , the conditional variance,- would move slowly toward the 
unconditional variance,   . Thus, the shocks to the long-run component do not decay quickly 
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due to the slow adaptation to new events, given that the conditional volatility has a long-run 
memory feature (Fig. 1a and 1b). The decay rate of the permanent component  , i.e., the speed of 
the mean reversion (Fig. A2), is estimated for OPEC prices at a high rate of 97.0% using the 
Gaussian error distribution (GED) with the TAR-AIC error correction term. Therefore, these 
decay rates imply that approximately 78.6%, i.e.,           , of a shock remains even after 
eight trading months, and that 98.4% of the shock remains using Gaussian error and Student’s 
distributions, respectively. For non-OPEC prices and when the error correction term is from 
TAR-AIC, the decay rate   is also high at 95.9% when we use the GED and 94.3% using the 
normal distribution. Hence, 71.4% and 62.7% of the effect of the shocks remains even after eight 
months using the GED and normal distribution, respectively. Using the AIC criterion for the 
threshold parameter, even after one year, the shocks to OPEC oil prices persist at 69.7%, i.e., 
        , whereas for non-OPEC oil prices, they are less persistent at 60.3%. By using the T-
significance criterion, the results indicate that, even after one year, the shocks to OPEC oil prices 
persist at 41.7%, i.e.,         , whereas for non-OPEC oil prices, they are more persistent at 
74.8%.  
Fig. 1a Conditional and permanent CGARCH-TAR of OPEC and non-OPEC prices 
 
 
The permanent component coefficients are well-defined for all variants of the ECM-TAR 
(MTAR)-CGARCH, i.e., models 1-4 (Table 4), implying the slow convergence of long-run 
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volatilities to their mean levels, which explains the long-run stability of the underlying process. 
By contrast, given that the sum of the transitory component parameters through       is 
negative for both crude oil prices, there is no half-life defined for either the OPEC or non-OPEC 
oil prices. This result is due to the high short-run volatility in the transitory variance. Short-term 
oil price volatilities of reflect a transitory supply surplus and a sudden shift in the inelastic oil 
demand curve (Borenstein 2008; Smith 2009). However, the long-run variability signals the 
overall regulation within the oil market through the stock of remaining proven crude oil 
reserves.
13
 Additionally, the long-run variation depends on real economic growth particularly in 
the advanced and emerging economies of the world.          
Fig. 1b Conditional and permanent CGARCH-MTAR of OPEC and non-OPEC prices
 
 
A negative (positive) sign of        signals an upward (downward) adjustment of the price 
starting from the next period and from the deviations around the long-run equilibrium (Enders 
and Siklos 2000). A small (high) value of the long-run coefficient   , which is associated with 
OPEC prices (non-OPEC prices), indicates that the error correction term of the oil price process 
identifies a slight (sizable) speed of adjustment in the monthly disequilibrium correction to reach 
the long-run equilibrium, following its degree of dependency from non-OPEC prices (OPEC 
prices), with respect to the long-run relationship between OPEC and non-OPEC prices. The 
                                                          
13
 The proven crude oil reserves have increased remarkably from 700 billion barrels in 1980 to 1.7001 trillion barrels 
at the end of 2014 (BP 2015). From such data and during the last decade, there is no geological reason that the prices 
of crude oil reach high and low record levels.  
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adjustment of the OPEC price process in relation to the positive (negative) discrepancies, i.e., 
after an external upward (downward) shock from hybrid events, in the long-run equilibrium 
shows the appropriate negative sign, and the slow adjustment indicates that the OPEC 
organization does not prefer moderate oil prices.
14
 By contrast, a rapid adjustment of the non-
OPEC price process in relation to the positive (negative) discrepancies in the long-run 
equilibrium signifies a preference for moderate oil prices after they increase (decrease). This 
speed difference in the adjustment process between the OPEC and non-OPEC price processes is 
evidence of competitive behavior between OPEC and non-OPEC countries, where the OPEC 
countries appear to be a pseudo-leader in the crude oil market.
15
  
   Table 4a ECM-CGARCH applied to OPEC and non-OPEC prices, 1973.10-2013.01  
ECM-Threshold OPEC Model _1 non-OPEC Model_2 OPEC Model_3 non-OPEC Model_4 
1 6.6E-05 (0.27) 6.4E-04 (0.46) -8.9E-04 (-2.61) 0.0016 (0.37) 

tect  -0.188 (-15.23) -0.547 (-6.68) -0.144 (-7.38) -0.517 (-6.04) 

tect  -0.151 (-5.03) -0.533 (-10.36) -0.354 (-11.16) -0.357 (-5.69) 
tp ,1   0.798 (48.21)  0.771 (44.27) 
1,1  tp     0.172 (7.19) 
2,1  tp  -0.235 (-12.47) 0.312 (6.03) -0.285 (-16.69) 0.317 (6.60) 
3,1  tp  -0.074 (-5.07) 0.051 (2.13) -0.020 (-2.06) 0.052 (2.15) 
tp ,2  0.843 (117.61)  0.856 (133.51)  
1,2  tp   0.167 (6.27)   
2,2  tp  0.159 (9.90) -0.243 (-5.10) 0.205 (12.21) -0.273 (-5.93) 
3,2  tp  0.013 (1.01)  -0.021 (-9.42)  
ˆ , ˆ  -0.0514 +0.0471 -0.0318 -0.0448 
Notes: Model_1 (OPEC_TAR_AIC, GED), Model_2 (non-OPEC_TAR_AIC, Gaussian), Model_3 
(OPEC_MTAR_TSIG, GED) and Model_4 (non-OPEC_MTAR_TSIG, GED). Using VAR lag selection 
criteria, we find that the optimal lag is three following the sequential modified LR statistic test, the final 
prediction error and the AIC. The z-statistic is in parentheses. For the modeling details, see Appendix 
A12: ECM-TAR-CGARCH.  
 
                                                          
14
 This slowness or sticky oil price is partially due to the adjustment costs because OPEC producers adjust their 
crude oil production and storage. Other features of this stickiness can be explained by the market power of OPEC. 
This phenomenon is already indicated by Borenstein and Shepard (2002) through the analysis of crude oil price 
shocks on the wholesale gasoline prices.     
15
 The US supply of light, sweet crude continues to outpace that of medium and heavy crude through 2015 and 
reduce the share markets of Russia and OPEC producers. According to the EIA (2015) approximately 90% of the 
growth of 3.0 million barrels per day in US production from 2011 to 2014 consisted of the light sweet type of oil.  
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=21512 
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OPEC producers could not drive crude oil prices down (up) for all participants in the market. 
The market participants, assuming the OPEC actions, caused the price fluctuations (Mohammadi 
2010; Hammoudeh 2010). However, our results show that non-OPEC countries do not strictly 
follow the OPEC strategies. The asymmetric adjustment provides evidence that the market 
participants sometimes misuse their market power in determining oil prices, in the sense that 
OPEC or to a lesser extent non-OPEC countries can influence oil prices by managing production 
quotas (Kaufmann et al. 2008). 
Describing the non-linear features of monthly oil price, the asymmetric adjustment means 
that hybrid events can impact the oil market environment turning into an open competitive 
behavior that influences the conditional variance (Engle and Ng 1993). Hybrid events depend on 
the factors behind the decreasing or increasing oil price process, and they are related to positive 
and negative discrepancies. These deviations work in the short and long-term and drive the 
movement of oil price. In the long-run, the deviations may occur based on fundamental factors 
mostly related to real macroeconomic variables (Kilian and Vega 2011) such as changes in crude 
oil inventories and oil demand due to the economic recovery (or crisis). They also come from 
non-fundamental factors particularly connected to speculation in oil futures markets (Zhang 
2013, Zhang et al. 2015), financial market risks (Zhang and Wei 2011), the US dollar exchange 
rate (Wu and Zhang 2014, Reboredo et al. 2014), and geopolitical or military conflicts (Tuzova 
and Qayum 2016).   
The Wald test for the null hypothesis     shows that the unit root is rejected only for 
model 2, and accepted for models 1, 3, and 4 (Table 4b). For non-OPEC prices only, the 
conditional variance   
  mean-reverts to a long-run trend level   , with the speed determined by 
 . The CGARCH process is covariance stationary when conditional variance is stationary, then 
both the permanent and transitory components must be covariance stationary, which necessitates 
that       and     (Engle and Lee 1999). Consequently, the permanent component    has 
a long memory, whereas the transitory component has a short memory (Ray and Tsay 2000; 
Gospodinov 2008). However, in all other models, the volatility of a long-run process is I(1), i.e., 
ρ=1; thus conditional variance contains a unit root, and the persistence of shocks is infinite; also, 
unconditional variance does not exist i.e. there is no mean reversion, but a shock remains through 
conditional variance and impacts future volatility over an infinite horizon (Bollerslev and Engle 
1993). The LM-Arch and Ljung-Box tests reject the null hypotheses of the ARCH effect and the 
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autocorrelation in the residuals (Table 4b). Thus, we should have correct estimates of the 
standards errors validating the statistical tests.  
 Table 4b Variance equation CGARCH applied to OPEC and non-OPEC prices 1973.10-2013.01 
Variance Equation OPEC Model _1 non-OPEC Model_2 OPEC Model_3 non-OPEC Model_4 
0
1  0.0056 (0.47) 0.0011 (3.04) 0.0052 (0.43) 0.0013 (1.43) 
 

 1
2
1   tt q  0.056 (1.42) 0.074 (2.19) 0.094 (1.05) 0.076 (1.81) 
 

 1
2
1   tt q  -0.968 (-38.13) -0.832 (-12.09) -0.822 (-3.09) -0.838 (-8.26) 
 

01 tq  0.970 (13.27) 0.943 (37.18) 0.959 (8.25) 0.969 (37.89) 
 

 2 1
2
1   tt  0.187 (1.70) 0.168 (3.88) 0.220 (1.29) 0.161 (3.10) 
AIC
 
-4.028 -4.098 -4.031  -4.207 
SSR 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.032 
ll  955.58 971.89 934.15 985.90 
LM-ARCH Test 0.733 (1) 0.931 (1) 0.928 (1) 0.967 (1) 
Ljung-Box Test 10.63 [0.56] 17.52 [0.13] 16.37 [0.18] 18.67 [0.13] 
Wald Test  for     0.1646 [0.68] 4.9801 [0.03] 0.1263 [0.72] 1.3747 [0.24] 
Notes: The z-statistics are in parentheses. The LM-ARCH statistic tests of no ARCH effects in the 
residuals of the estimated equation; the number of lags is in parentheses. The Ljung-Box statistic tests 
whether there are no serial correlations in the residuals. The Wald test is run to test the unit value of the 
persistence parameter   using the    statistic. The p-values are in brackets.    
 
From TAR-models 1 and 2, the point estimates for       
 , i.e., crude oil price 
undervaluation, are somewhat high, between -0.15 and -0.53, suggesting that deviations between 
an increase in the long-run and reasonable crude oil prices are eliminated somewhat quickly. 
Also, from TAR-models 1 and 2, the point estimates for       
 , i.e., crude oil price 
overvaluation, are between -0.19 and -0.55, indicating that an increase and a decrease in the 
long-run around the crude oil price equilibrium level have comparable magnitudes. The negative 
or positive level-discrepancies of OPEC prices from the long-run equilibrium are eliminated less 
quickly in comparison to non-OPEC prices. These results confirm that OPEC sets moderate oil 
prices and is less sensible to both the overvaluation and the undervaluation of crude oil prices 
compared to non-OPEC producers.  
In contrast, from the MTAR-models 3 and 4 related to a margin behavior, the point estimates 
for       
  are on the intermediate side, between -0.354 and -0.357, and lead to the quasi-same 
marginal reactions of OPEC and non-OPEC countries. These findings suggest that the negative 
difference-discrepancies of the crude oil prices from the long-run equilibrium are corrected at 
moderate rates with quasi-similar magnitudes for both OPEC and non-OPEC countries to 
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preserve their income from the international market. But, the point estimates for       
  indicate 
that the positive difference-discrepancies of non-OPEC prices from the long-run equilibrium are 
quickly corrected at medium rates in comparison to OPEC prices. These results prove that OPEC 
sets moderate oil prices and is more sensible to the undervaluation than to the overvaluation of 
crude oil prices. It appears that both OPEC and non-OPEC countries have to learn more about 
the declining trend in oil prices. More importantly, the quick adjustments of non-OPEC prices to 
the long-run equilibrium appear to have a stabilizing effect and be less inflationist. In these 
cases, asymmetry is largely driven by a medium response to negative shocks, particularly from 
non-OPEC countries.   
The negative discrepancies, with TAR or MTAR adjustments, are related to many factors, 
such as positive changes in crude oil inventories, economic recession, excess oil supply, 
decreasing oil demand, decreasing US dollar exchange rate, financial crisis, geopolitical and 
military conflicts, and shifting international sanctions. From the MTAR adjustment, such 
negative deviations are partially and moderately corrected with a similar magnitude by both 
OPEC and non-OPEC countries, which means that both OPEC and non-OPEC countries do not 
welcome a decreasing oil price tendency.  
By contrast, the positive deviations could occur from negative changes in crude oil 
inventories, economic growth, decreasing oil supply, excess oil demand, increasing US dollar 
exchange rate, financial stability, geopolitical and military reconciliation, and international 
sanctions. From the TAR adjustment, such positive deviations are partially and fairly more 
corrected by non-OPEC countries than by OPEC countries; which mean that OPEC does not 
favor a moderate oil price tendency.    
Overall, OPEC appears to have less aversion behavior to long-run changes in the crude oil 
price than the non-OPEC producers. The crude oil prices of non-OPEC countries would adjust 
upward at a quick rate to correct the imbalance with OPEC crude oil prices compared to OPEC 
prices if they were to adjust upward correcting the imbalance. The subdued adjustment of 
positive discrepancies to the long-run equilibrium may occur because OPEC countries want to 
control the high prices of oil, especially through the adjustment of negative discrepancies, and 
attempt to sporadically retain oil prices around an equilibrium level. Non-OPEC countries also 
provide visible support in this respect mostly through the adjustment of positive discrepancies. In 
the short-run, there is evidence of a causal flow of changes of contemporary oil prices from non-
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OPEC to OPEC countries and vice versa, with many discernible feedback relationships. The 
OPEC quota agreements contribute to this short-run price fluctuation. In particular, the  -
statistics corresponding to causality reveal that the price of each group, OPEC or non-OPEC 
producers, affect the movements in the other group’s current price rate. It appears that the 
contemporaneous short-run variation of OPEC prices has a greater effect than the corresponding 
variation of non-OPEC prices. This result explains in the short-run that non-OPEC countries play 
a slightly more important role than OPEC countries for determining the crude oil prices in the 
international market.  
       
IV. Conclusions   
We have examined the dynamics of OPEC and non-OPEC oil prices within an original TAR-
Error Correction-CGARCH model, leading to a parsimonious representation of some stylized 
features for the period January 1973-April 2013. The results show that for both OPEC and non-
OPEC producers, price shocks tend to be both persistent and volatile, indicating that there is a 
long memory in the volatility of international crude oil prices. Also, due to the high short-run 
volatility in the transitory variance, there is no half-life defined for either OPEC or non-OPEC oil 
prices. More concretely, our findings suggest that the OPEC prices adjustment process in relation 
to the positive deviations from the long-run equilibrium is slow, implying that OPEC producers 
do not prefer moderate oil prices. However, the reverse holds for non-OPEC producers, which 
prefer rapid adjustment when oil prices are too high. These differences in speed between OPEC 
and non-OPEC price adjustments imply that there is evidence of a quasi-competitive behavior 
and different profit and pricing strategies between OPEC and non-OPEC countries. OPEC 
producers do not drive crude oil market prices up or down; to some extent, market traders and 
speculators assuming OPEC actions can cause oil price volatilities. The results also show that 
non-OPEC countries do not strictly follow OPEC strategies, except in the MTAR model with a 
negative error correction term. This exception means that both OPEC and non-OPEC producers 
react similarly to negative discrepancies when oil prices are too low.   
Despite some differences in crude oil costs between OPEC and non-OPEC countries, 
threshold cointegration proves that there are small differences in crude oil prices. If OPEC 
appears to be well-integrated, then the crude oil market is a quasi-integrated market with a fringe 
competitive. Future market stability is related to the extent to which there is real collaboration 
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between non-OPEC and OPEC countries in the international market. Non-OPEC countries may 
have a greater role in terms of a continuous increase in their supply and OPEC members must 
address a more reasonable price due to their increased spare capacity, mainly held by Saudi 
Arabia. In the future paper, we will extend the ECM-TAR (MTAR)-CGARCH model to capture 
leverage effects by adding the asymmetry parameters in the dynamic volatility. We expect to 
explore the asymmetric volatility effects on the permanent and transitory components and to 
detect whether dynamic volatility will be more amplified.   
Due to the excessive volatilities during the last decade, there has been an emergency for 
policy makers in regard to how to reduce the economic impacts of the extreme price volatility 
from real market distortions or speculative trading. In addition, the main OPEC and non-OPEC 
producers have to develop a new organizational alternative to OPEC to face any expected 
positive or negative bubbles in the oil market and to diversify the pricing system to allow 
reasonable prices with respect to the quality, timing, and location of oil.    
The economic growth of developed countries should be more accurately monitored by oil 
producers to avoid sudden shocks driven by the demand of oil. In parallel, technological, 
geopolitical, economic, and marketing challenges in oil markets will require massive investments 
by oil producers and a flexible regulation of the incremental production. To face the expected 
demand in the future, oil producers, and mainly OPEC must invest more in the petroleum sector. 
By preventing other spikes in crude oil prices, OPEC projects realizing massive investments of 
$400 billion per year over the next 25 years, i.e., $10 trillion from 2015 to 2040 (OPEC 2015 
World Oil Outlook, page 42). However, the excessively low price level does not support the 
expected oil investment perspective.   
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Appendices  
A1 Methodology 
A11 Threshold cointegration 
Preliminarily, the two-step method by Engle and Granger (1987) is employed to test cointegration 
between    and    the logged OPEC and non-OPEC oil prices, respectively. By estimating the long-run 
relationship              , we obtain the residuals    . Enders and Siklos (ES, 2001) argue that the 
test for cointegration and its extensions are mis-specified if the adjustment is asymmetric. They propose 
the following asymmetric adjustment, known as the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model:      
                          , where    and    are the speed–adjustment coefficients and    is the 
indicator function, which is defined as the following:                 and                . The 
parameter    means adjustments from below the threshold   (widening), because the residual is greater 
than the threshold. The opposite holds true for   , meaning that the adjustment is from above the 
threshold. They also suggest an alternative to the indicator function through the momentum TAR 
(MTAR), defined as the following:                  and                 . According to ES 
(2001), it is not necessary for the threshold to coincide with the attractor. Thus, the appropriate estimate 
of   gives the lowest residual sum of the squares. If the system is convergent, then the long-run 
equilibrium value of the sequence is given by   which can be 0. The sufficient conditions for the 
stationarity of     are     ,      and                (Petrucelli and Woolford 1984). In such a 
case, if       is above its threshold value  , then the adjustment is at the rate   , and if       is below  , 
then the adjustment is at the rate   . This adjustment will be symmetric if      . However, if the null 
hypothesis Ho:       is rejected, then by using the TAR model, we can obtain the signs of asymmetry. 
As demonstrated by Sichel (1993), a negative “deepness” i.e.           of     implies that increases tend 
to persist, whereas decreases tend to revert quickly towards equilibrium. For example if          
 , then the negative phase of the     series will tend to be more persistent than the positive phase. A 
searching method for a consistent estimate of the threshold was adopted by using a method proposed by 
Chan (1993). Besides, the MTAR model can be used to obtain different types of asymmetry. For instance, 
if          , then the MTAR exhibits little adjustment for positive       , but substantial decay for 
negative       . In other words, increases tend to persist, but decreases tend to revert quickly back to the 
attractor irrespective of where disequilibrium is relative to the attractor. The threshold is also estimated 
using Chan’s methodology.  
By implementing the TAR and MTAR adjustments and defining the  -statistic for the null hypothesis 
of non-stationarity of    , i.e. under           ,       has a unit root, the value of  -statistic is 
compared to the critical values computed by ES (2001). If we reject the null hypothesis, it is possible to 
test for asymmetric adjustment because    and    converge to a multivariate normal distribution (Tong 
1990). The  -statistic is used to test for the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment         .  
 
A12 ECM-TAR-CGARCH 
The estimation of the following error correction model with a threshold adjustment is justified by the 
existence of a threshold cointegration: 
                                 
          
           
 
             
 
                            (1) 
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where the variables       
           and       
              are the error correction terms, defined 
based on the TAR and MTAR indicator functions   . The coefficient    signifies the rate of convergence 
from gravitation-back toward the long-run equilibrium path. Given that the variable       
  means an 
undervaluation of crude oil prices; we expect that the sign of the parameter    will be negative, therefore 
leading to a downward adjustment. The variable       
  indicates an overvaluation; we expect that    will 
be negative, which drives to an upward adjustment converging to the long-run equilibrium. If the 
convergence condition is confirmed, we have         , driving to an upward or downward 
adjustment. The error term    is assumed to follow the specific component GARCH (CGARCH) errors 
distribution, used particularly in financial applications (Gospodinov 2008); its structure is determined by 
the following equations: 
       
                                               and                                                  (2) 
  
              
              
                                                                                    (3) 
                       
      
                                                                                         (4) 
Eq. (3) of the conditional variance   
  reveals the long-run component    and the short-run component 
   
     . This transitory component    includes the deviations around the long-run component. Engle 
and Lee (1999) point out that the CGARCH process, defined in separated equations (3) and (4), is weakly 
stationary if     and      . By combining the transitory and permanent equations, the model is 
reduced to a non-linearly restricted CGARCH (2, 2).    
The CGARCH model captures the volatility persistence of the transitory and permanent dynamics. 
The long-run trend of the conditional variance shows the idea of time-varying long run volatility. The 
parameter   corresponds to the decay rate and determines the speed of the mean reversion, which assumes 
that the high and lower crude oil prices are temporary. Therefore, it is expected that the high and lower 
deviations, due to different shocks to the prices, will go back to an average price. The conditional 
variance shows the long-run mean reversion to a constant level, given by the unconditional variance   . 
The volatility prediction error      
      
   has a zero-mean and is serially uncorrelated; it drives the 
dynamics of the permanent component (Poon et al. 2006). The power of the shocks to the permanent 
component is defined by the first-order parameter  . The shocks to the transitory component revert to the 
trend   , whereas in the GARCH model, the shocks decay to the unconditional variance     
 . The 
strength of the shocks to the transitory component is defined by the first-order parameter  . The 
permanent process    has a memory close to the unit root when   is close to 1. If        , then the 
transitory mean-reverting process    has a more rapid time decay, governed by      . If    , then 
the conditional variance   
  mean-reverts to a long-run trend level    at speed  . It is assumed that when 
         , the permanent component is more persistent than the transitory component. The 
persistence in the transitory component is lower than the persistence in the permanent component, 
because        . Consequently, the permanent component     has a long memory, whereas the 
transitory component has a short memory. The volatility persistence of transitory large shocks is shorter 
than shocks due to habitual news and events, but it remains the case that large shocks may have a 
permanent impact. However, with the CGARCH structure, the parameters do not have all non-negative 
signs. The transitory component may be negative, suggesting that shocks impact volatility during the 
convergence of the long-run trend.  
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
A2 Figures 
      Fig. A1 Level and first difference of logarithm of OPEC and non-OPEC crude oil prices  
 
 
       
           Fig. A2  -GED Persistence shocks over month’s horizon on OPEC and non-OPEC prices 
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